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Abstract
We study platforms in the sharing economy and discuss the
need for incentivizing users to explore options that otherwise
would not be chosen. For instance, rental platforms such as
Airbnb typically rely on customer reviews to provide users
with relevant information about different options. Yet, often a
large fraction of options does not have any reviews available.
Such options are frequently neglected as viable choices, and
in turn are unlikely to be evaluated, creating a vicious cycle.
Platforms can engage users to deviate from their preferred
choice by offering monetary incentives for choosing a differ-
ent option instead. To efficiently learn the optimal incentives
to offer, we consider structural information in user prefer-
ences and introduce a novel algorithm - Coordinated Online
Learning (CoOL) - for learning with structural information
modeled as convex constraints. We provide formal guaran-
tees on the performance of our algorithm and test the viabil-
ity of our approach in a user study with data of apartments on
Airbnb. Our findings suggest that our approach is well-suited
to learn appropriate incentives and increase exploration on the
investigated platform.
Introduction
In recent years, numerous sharing economy platforms with
a variety of goods and services have emerged. These plat-
forms are shaped by users that primarily act in their own
interest to maximize their utility. However, such behavior
might interfere with the usefulness of the platforms. For ex-
ample, users of mobility sharing systems typically prefer to
drop off rentals at the location in closest proximity, while a
more balanced distribution would allow the mobility sharing
service to operate more efficiently.
Undesirable user behavior in the sharing economy is in
many cases even self-reinforcing. For example, users in the
apartment rental marketplace Airbnb are less likely to select
infrequently reviewed apartments and are therefore unlikely
to provide reviews for these apartments (Fradkin 2014). This
is also reflected in the distribution of reviews, where in many
cities 20% of apartments account for more than 80% of cus-
tomer reviews1.
*Work performed while at ETH Zurich.
Copyright © 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
1Data from insideairbnb.com.
Such dynamics create a need for platforms in the shar-
ing economy to actively engage users to shape demand and
improve efficiency. Several previous papers have proposed
the idea of using monetary incentives to encourage desir-
able behavior in such systems. One example is (Frazier et al.
2014), who studied the problem in a multi-armed bandit set-
ting, where a principal (e.g. a marketplace) attempts to max-
imize utility by incentivizing agents to explore arms other
than the myopically preferred one. In their setting, the opti-
mal amount is known to the system, and the main goal is to
quantify the required payments to achieve an optimal policy
with myopic agents. The idea of shaping demand through
monetary incentives in the sharing economy has also been
tested in practice. For example, (Singla et al. 2015) use mon-
etary incentives to encourage users of bike sharing systems
to return bikes at beneficial locations, making automatic of-
fers through the bike sharing app.
In this context, an important question is what amounts a
platform should offer to maximize its utility. (Singla et al.
2015) introduce a simple protocol for learning optimal in-
centives in the bike sharing system to make users switch
from the preferred station to a more beneficial one, ignor-
ing information about specific switches and additional con-
text. Extending on these ideas, we explore a general online
learning protocol for efficiently learning optimal incentives.
Our Contributions
We provide the following main contributions in this paper:
• Structural information: We consider structural informa-
tion in user preferences to speed up learning of incen-
tives, and provide a general framework to model structure
across tasks via convex constraints. Our algorithm, Co-
ordinated Online Learning (CoOL) is also of interest for
related multi-task learning problems.
• Computational efficiency: We introduce two novel ideas
of sporadic and approximate projections to increase the
computational efficiency of our algorithm. We derive for-
mal guarantees on the performance of the CoOL algo-
rithm and achieve no-regret bounds in this setting.
• User study on Airbnb: We collect a unique data set
through a user study with apartments on Airbnb and test
the viability and benefit of the CoOL algorithm on this
dataset.
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Preliminaries
In the following, we introduce the general problem setting
of this paper.
Platform. We investigate a general platform in the sharing
economy, such as the apartment rental marketplace Airbnb.
On this platform, users can choose from n goods and ser-
vices, denoted as items. A user that arrives at time t chooses
an item it ∈ [n]. If the user chooses to buy item it, the plat-
form gains utility uti.
Incentivizing exploration. The initial choice, item it,
might not maximize the platform’s utility, and the platform
might be interested in offering a different item jt with utility
utj > u
t
i instead. For example, j could represent an infre-
quently reviewed item that the platform wants to explore. To
motivate the user to select item jt instead, the platform can
offer an incentive pt, for example in the form of a monetary
discount on that item. The user can either accept or reject
the offer pt depending on the private cost ct, where the user
accepts the offer if pt ≥ ct and rejects the offer otherwise. If
the user accepts the offer, the utility gain of the platform is
utj − uti − pt.
Objective. In this setting, two tasks need to be optimized
to achieve a high utility gain: finding good switches i → j,
and finding good incentives pt. Good switches i → j are
those, in which the achievable utility gain is positive, i.e.
utj − uti − ct > 0. To realize a positive utility gain, the offer
pt needs to be greater or equal to ct, since otherwise the offer
would be rejected.
In this paper, we focus on learning optimal incentives pt
over time, while the platform chooses relevant switches i→
j independently.
Methodology
In this section, we present our methology for learning op-
timal incentives pti,j and start with a single pair of items
(i, j). We allow for natural constraints on pti,j , such that
pti,j ∈ Si,j , where Si,j is convex and non-empty. For exam-
ple, Si,j might be lower-bounded by 0 and upper-bounded
by the maximum discount that the platform is willing to of-
fer.
Single Pair of Items
We consider the popular algorithmic framework of online
convex programming (OCP) (Zinkevich 2003) to learn op-
timal incentives pti,j for a single pair of items. The OCP al-
gorithm is a gradient-descent style algorithm that updates
with an adaptive learning rate and performs a projection af-
ter every gradient step to maintain feasibility within the con-
straints Si,j . We use τ ti,j to denote the number of times a pair
of items i, j has been observed and η to denote the learning
rate. To measure the performance of the algorithm, we use
the loss lt(pti,j), which is the difference between the opti-
mal prediction and the prediction provided by the algorithm,
such that lt(pt) = 1{pt≥ct} · (pt − ct) + 1{pt<ct} · (u −
ct) for u ≥ ct, and lt(pt) = 0 for u < ct2.
2Note that this loss function is non-convex. A convex version is
presented in the case study.
Algorithm 1: OL – Online Learning
1 Input:
• Learning rate constant: η > 0
2 Initialize: p0i,j ∈ S, τ0i,j = 0
3 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
4 Suffer loss lt(pti,j)
5 Calculate gradient gti,j
6 Set τ ti,j = τ
t−1
i,j + 1
7 Update pt+1i,j = p
t
i,j − η√τti,j g
t
i,j
end
The algorithm, Online Learning (OL), for a single pair
of items is shown in Algorithm 1. The regret, which mea-
sures the difference in losses against any (constant) compet-
ing weight vector pi,j ∈ S after T rounds, is defined as
RegretOLi,j (T, pi,j) =
T∑
t=1
(
lt(pti,j)− lt(pi,j)
)
. (1)
Multiple Pairs of Items
We now relax the assumption of a fixed pair of items and
return to our original problem of learning optimal incentives
for multiple pairs of items, i.e. the algorithm receives spe-
cific items it and jt as input for each user. If we consider all
items n on the platform, the total number of pairs is n2 − n.
For learning the optimal incentive for each pair of items,
the algorithm maintains a specific learning rate proportional
to 1/
√
τti,j for each pair of items and performs one gradient
update step using Algorithm 1. We refer to this straightfor-
ward adaptation of the OL algorithm as Independent On-
line Learning (IOL) and use this algorithm as a baseline for
our analysis. Using regret bounds of (Zinkevich 2003) and
denoting the number of pairs of items as K, we can upper
bound the regret of IOL as
RegretIOL(T ) ≤ 3
2
√
TK ‖Smax‖ ‖gmax‖ . (2)
Structural Information
In a real-world setting, incentives for different pairs of items
typically are not independent, and in some cases, certain
structural information may help to speed up learning of opti-
mal incentives. In the following, we discuss several relevant
types of structural information.
Independent learning. In this baseline setting each pair
of items is learned individually. Thus, the number of incen-
tives that need to be learned grows quadratically with the
number of items on a platform. While applicable for a small
number of items, this approach is not favorable on typical
platforms in the sharing economy.
Shared learning. Another commonly studied setting is
shared learning. In this setting, all pairs of items are con-
sidered equivalent, and only one global incentive is learned.
While allowing the platform to learn about many pairs of
items at the same time, this approach fails to consider nat-
ural asymmetries in the problem. For example, the required
incentive for switching from i to j is often different than the
required incentive for switching from j to i, as can be also
observed in the case study of this paper.
Metric/hemimetric structure. Assuming that the re-
quired incentives are related to the dissimilarity of items i
and j, metrics are a natural choice to model structural depen-
dencies, as they capture the property of triangle inequalities
in dissimilarity functions. However, incentives for pairs of
items are not necessarily required to be symmetric. For ex-
ample, the required incentives for switching from a highly
reviewed apartment on Airbnb to one without reviews is
likely higher than vice versa. Therefore, we use hemimet-
rics, which are a relaxed form of a metric that satisfy only
non-negativity constraints and triangular inequalities, cap-
turing asymmetries in preferences (cf. (Singla, Tschiatschek,
and Krause 2016)). The usefulness of the hemimetric struc-
ture for learning optimal incentives is demonstrated in the
experiments.
In the following section, we introduce a general-purpose
algorithm for learning with structural information, where the
structure is defined by convex constraints on the solution
space. The key idea of our algorithm is to coordinate be-
tween individual pairs of items by projecting onto the re-
sulting convex set. We generalize our approach for contex-
tual learning, where additional features, such as information
about users, may be available. Since projecting onto convex
sets may be computationally expensive, we further extend
our analysis to allow projections to be sporadic (i.e. only af-
ter certain gradient steps) and approximate (i.e. with some
error compared to the optimal projection).
Learning with Structural Information
We begin this section by introducing a general framework
for specifying structural information via convex constraints.
We denote each pair of items as a distinct problem z ∈ [K],
where K is the total number of pairs of items. Each problem
z may be associated with additional features, for example
with information about the current user. As is common in on-
line learning, we consider a d dimensional weight vectorwz
for each problem z ∈ [K] for learning optimal incentives.
The prediction pz is equal to the inner product between wz
and the d dimensional feature vector. In the previous section,
we described the special case with d = 1 and a unit feature
vector, such thatwz is equivalent to the prediction pz .
Specifying Structure via Convex Constraints
Similar to constraints on pz , we allow for convex constraints
on wz , such that wz ∈ Sz ⊆ Rd. We assume Sz is a con-
vex, non-empty, and compact set, where ‖Sz‖ is the Eu-
clidean norm of the solution space3. Further, we assume
‖Sz‖ ≤ ‖Smax‖ for some constant ‖Smax‖. We denote the
joint solution space of the K problems as S = S1 × · · · ×
Sz × · · · × SK ⊆ Rd·K and define wt ∈ S as the concate-
3Euclidean norm is used throughout, unless otherwise specified.
nation of the problem specific weight vectors at time t, i.e.
wt =
[
(wt1)
′ · · ·(wtz)′ · · ·(wtK)′
]′
.
The available structural information is modelled by a set
of convex constraints, such that the joint competing weight
vectorw∗, against which the loss at each round is measured,
lies in a convex, non-empty, and closed set S∗ ⊆ S, repre-
senting a restricted joint solution space, i.e.w∗ ∈ S∗. In the
following, we provide several practical examples of how S∗
can be defined.
Independent learning. S∗ ≡ S models the setting where
the problems are unrelated/independent.
Shared learning. A shared parameter setting can be mod-
eled as
S∗ = {w∗ ∈ S |w∗1 = · · · = w∗z = · · · = w∗K}.
Instead of sharing all parameters, another common scenario
is to share only a few parameters. For a given d′ ≤ d, sharing
d′ parameters across the problems can be modeled as
S∗ = {w∗ ∈ S |w∗1[1 :d′] · · · = w∗z[1 :d′] = · · ·w∗K [1 :d′]}
where w∗z[1 : d
′] denotes the first d′ entries in w∗z . This ap-
proach is useful for sharing certain parameters that do not
depend on the specific problem. For example, in the case of
apartments on Airbnb, a shared feature could be the distance
between apartments.
Hemimetric structure. To model dissimilarities between
items for learning optimal incentives, we use the hemimet-
ric set. Specifically, we use r-bounded hemimetrics, which,
next to non-negativity constraints and triangular inequalities,
also include non-negativity and upper bound constraints. For
d = 1, the convex set representing r-bounded hemimetrics
is given by S∗ =
{w∗ ∈ S |w∗i,j ∈ [0, r],w∗i,j ≤ w∗i,k +w∗k,j ∀i, j, k ∈ [n]}
Our Algorithm
In the following, we introduce our algorithm, Coordinated
Online Learning (CoOL).
Exploiting Structure via Weighted Projections. The
CoOL algorithm exploits structural information in a prin-
cipled way by performing weighted projections to S∗, with
weights for a problem z proportional to
√
τ tz . Intuitively,
the weights allow us to learn about problems that have been
observed infrequently while avoiding to “unlearn” problems
that have been observed more frequently. A formal justifi-
cation for using weighted projections is provided in the ex-
tended version of this paper (Hirnschall et al. 2018).
We define Qt as a square diagonal matrix of size dK with
each
√
τ tz represented d times. In the one-dimensional case
(d = 1), we can write Qt as
Qt =

√
τ t1 0
. . .
0
√
τ tK
 . (3)
Using w˜ to jointly represent the current weight vectors of
all the learners at time t (cf. Line 7 in Algorithm 2), we
Algorithm 2: CoOL – Coordinated Online Learning
1 Input:
• Projection steps: (ξt)t∈[T ] where ξt ∈ {0, 1}
• Projection accuracy: (δt)t∈[T ] where δt ≥ 0
• Learning rate constant: η > 0
2 Initialize:w1z ∈ Sz , τ0z = 0
3 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
4 Suffer loss lt(wtz)
5 Calculate (sub-)gradient gtz
6 Set τ tz = τ
t−1
z + 1
7 Update w˜t+1 = wt; w˜t+1z = w
t
z − η√τtz g
t
z
8 if ξt = 1 then
9 DefineQt as per Equation (3)
10 Computewt+1 = AProj(w˜t+1, δt,Qt)
else
11 wt+1z = argmin
w∈Sz
∥∥w − w˜t+1z ∥∥2
end
end
compute the new joint weight vector wt+1 (cf. Line 10 in
Algorithm 2) by projecting onto S∗, using
wt+1 = argmin
w∈S∗
(w − w˜)′Qt(w − w˜). (4)
We refer to this as the weighted projection onto S∗. Since
S∗ is convex and the projection is a special case of the Breg-
man projection, the projection onto S∗ is unique (cf. (Cesa-
Bianchi and Lugosi 2006; Rakhlin and Tewari 2009)).
Sporadic and Approximate Projections. For large scale
applications (i.e. largeK or large d), projecting at every step
could be computationally very expensive: a projection onto
a generic convex set S∗ would require solving a quadratic
program of dimension dK. To allow for computationally ef-
ficient updates, we introduce two novel algorithmic ideas:
sporadic and approximate projections, defined by the above-
mentioned sequences (ξt)t∈[T ] and (δt)t∈[T ]. Here, δt de-
notes the desired accuracy at time t and is given as input to
Function 3, AProj, for computing approximate projections.
This way, the accuracy can be efficiently controlled using the
duality gap of the projections. As we shall see in our exper-
imental results, these two algorithmic ideas of sporadic and
approximate projections allow us to speed up the algorithm
by an order of magnitude while retaining the improvements
obtained through the projections.
Algorithm 2, when invoked with ξt = 1, δt = 0 ∀t ∈ [T ],
corresponds to a variant of our algorithm with exact projec-
tions at every time step. When invoked with ξt = 0 ∀t ∈ [T ],
our algorithm corresponds to the IOL baseline.
Relation to existing approaches. A related algorithm is
the AdaGrad algorithm (Duchi, Hazan, and Singer 2011),
which uses the sum of the magnitudes of past gradients to
determine the learning rate at each time t, where larger past
gradients correspond to smaller learning rates. A key differ-
ence to the CoOL algorithm is that the AdaGrad algorithm
Function 3: AProj – Approximate Projection
1 Input: w˜, δt,Qt
2 Define f t(w) = (w − w˜)′Qt(w − w˜) forw ∈ S
3 Choose
wt+1 ∈ {w ∈ S∗ : f t(w)− min
w′∈S∗
f t(w ′) ≤ δt}
4 Return:wt+1
enforces exact projections after every iteration. This is par-
ticularly problematic for large, complex structures since pro-
jections on these structures often rely on numeric approx-
imations, that may not guarantee to converge to the exact
solution in finite time.
Performance Guarantees and Analysis
In this section, we analyze worst-case regret bounds of the
CoOL algorithm against a competing weight vector w∗ ∈
S∗. The proofs are provided in the extended version of this
paper (Hirnschall et al. 2018).
General Bounds
We begin with a general result, without assumptions on the
projection accuracy and rate.
Theorem 1. The regret of the CoOL algorithm is bounded
by RegretCoOL(T ) ≤
1
2η
‖Smax‖2
√
TK + 2η ‖gmax‖2
√
TK (R1)
+
T∑
t=1
1{(¬ξt−1)∧(ξt)} ‖Smax‖ ‖gmax‖ (R2)
+
1
η
T∑
t=1
1{ξt}
(
δt +
√
2δt(tK)1/4 ‖Smax‖
)
(R3)
+
1
2η
‖Smax‖2 − 2η ‖gmax‖2K. (R4)
The regret in Theorem 1 has four components. R1 comes
from the standard regret analysis in the OCP framework,
R2 comes from sporadic projections, R3 comes from the al-
lowed error in the projections, and R4 is a constant.
Note that when ξt = 0 for all t (i.e. no projections are
performed) and η is proportional to 1/
√
τti,j , we get the same
regret bounds proportional to
√
T as for the IOL algorithm.
This also reveals the worst-case nature of the regret bounds
of Theorem 1, i.e. the proven bounds for CoOL are agnostic
to the specific structure S∗ and the order of task instances.
Sporadic/Approximate Projection Bounds
To provide specific bounds for the practically useful setting
of sporadic and approximate projections, we introduce α and
β and the user chosen parameters cα and cβ to control the
frequency and accuracy of the projections.
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Figure 1: Simulation results for learning hemimetrics. (a,b,c) compare the performance of CoOL against IOL for different
orders of problem instances. (d,e,f) show the speed/performance tradeoff using sporadic and approximate projections.
Corollary 1. Set η = 12
‖Smax‖
‖gmax‖ . ∀t ∈ [T ], define
ξt ∼ Bernoulli(α) with α = cα√
T
,
δt = cβ(1− β)2
√
K√
t
‖Smax‖2
where constants cα ∈ [0,
√
T ], cβ ≥ 0, and β ∈ [0, 1]. The
expected regret (w.r.t. (ξt)t∈[T ]) of the CoOL algorithm is
bounded by E [RegretCoOL(T )] ≤
2
√
TK ‖Smax‖ ‖gmax‖ ·
(
1 +
cα
2
√
K
(
1− cα√
T
)
+ cα(cβ +
√
2cβ)(1− β)
)
.
As shown in Corollary 1, projections are required to be
more accurate for higher values of t. Intuitively, this is re-
quired so that already learned weights are not unlearned
through inaccurate projections. Using the definitions under
Corollary 1, we can prove worst-case regret bounds propor-
tional to
√
T for this setting.
Performance Analysis for Hememtric Structure
We now test the performance of the CoOL algorithm on syn-
thetic data with an underlying hemimetric structure.
Hemimetric projection. To be able to perform weighted
projections onto the hemimetric polytope, we use the met-
ric nearness algorithm (Sra, Tropp, and Dhillon 2004) as a
starting point. For our purposes, three modifications of the
algorithm are required: First, we lift the requirement of sym-
metry to generalize from metrics to hemimetrics. Second,
the metric nearness algorithm does not guarantee a solu-
tion in the metric set in finite time. However, to calculate
the duality gap, the solution is required to be feasible. Thus,
we apply the Floyd-Warshall algorithm (Floyd 1962) after
every iteration to receive a solution in the hemimetric set.
Third, we add weights to the triangle inequalities to allow
for weighted projections and further add upper and lower
bound constraints.
Data structure. To empirically test the performance of
the CoOL algorithm on the hemimetric set, we synthetically
generate data with d = 1 and model the underlying struc-
ture S∗ as a set of r-bounded hemimetrics with n = 10,
resulting in K = 90 problems. We use a simple underlying
ground-truth hemimetric w∗, where the n items belong to
two equal-sized clusters, with p∗i,j = 1 if i and j are from
Location: Manhattan 
1.2 miles to Times Square
Location: Brooklyn 
4.4 miles to Times Square
Price per night: 80$
0 reviews
Apartment 1
Price per night: 80$
 · 23 reviews
Apartment 2
Figure 2: Snapshot of the user survey study on MTurk.4
the same cluster and p∗i,j = 9 otherwise. The results of our
experiment in Figure 1 illustrate the potential runtime im-
provement using sporadic/approximate projections.
Random order of problems. Problem instances zt are
chosen uniformly at random at every time step. The CoOL
algorithm achieves a significantly lower regret than the IOL
algorithm, benefiting from the weighted projections onto S∗.
At T = 500, the regret of CoOL is less than half of that of
the IOL, cf. Figure 1(a).
Batches of problems. In the batch setting, a problem in-
stance is chosen uniformly at random, then it is repeated five
times before choosing a new problem instance. Compared to
the above-mentioned random order, the IOL algorithm suf-
fers a lower regret because of a higher probability that prob-
lems are repeatedly shown. Furthermore, the benefit of the
projections onto S∗ for the CoOL algorithm is reduced, cf.
Figure 1(b), showing that the benefit of the projections de-
pends on the specific order of the problem instances for a
given structure.
Single-problem setting. A single problem z is repeated
in every round. As illustrated, in this case the IOL algo-
rithm and the CoOL algorithm have the same regret, cf.
Figure 1(c). In order to get a better understanding of us-
ing weights Qt for the weighted projection, we also show a
variant uw-CoOL using Qt as identity matrix. Unweighted
projection or using the wrong weights can hinder the con-
vergence of the learners, as shown in Figure 1(c) for this
extreme case of a single-problem setting.
Varying the rate of projection (α). The regret of the
CoOL algorithm monotonically increases as α decreases,
and is equivalent to the regret of the IOL algorithm at α = 0,
cf. Figure 1(d). In the range of α values between 1 and 0.1,
the regret of the CoOL algorithm is relatively constant and
increases strongly only as α approaches 0. With α as low as
0.1, the regret of the CoOL algorithm in this setting is still
almost half of that of the IOL algorithm.
Varying the accuracy of projection (β). The regret of
the CoOL algorithm monotonically increases as β decreases,
and exceeds that of the IOL algorithm for values smaller
than 0.65 because of high errors in the projections, cf. Fig-
ure 1(e). In the range of β values between 1 and 0.85, the
regret of the CoOL algorithm is relatively constant and less
4Real pictures from Airbnb replaced with illustrative examples.
than half of that of the IOL algorithm.
Runtime vs. approximate projections. As expected, the
runtime of the projection monotonically decreases as β de-
creases, cf. Figure 1(f). For values of β smaller than 0.95,
the runtime of the projection is less than 10% of that of the
exact projection. Thus, with β values in the range of 0.85 to
0.95, the CoOL algorithm achieves the best of both worlds:
the regret is significantly smaller than that of IOL, with an
order of magnitude speed up in the runtime compared to ex-
act projections.
Airbnb Case Study
To test the viability and benefit of the CoOL algorithm in a
realistic setting, we conducted a user study with data from
the marketplace Airbnb.
Experimental Setup
We use the following setup in our user study:
Airbnb dataset. Using data of Airbnb apartments from
insideairbnb.com, we created a dataset of 20 apart-
ments as follows: we chose apartments from 4 types in New
York City by location (Manhattan or Brooklyn) and number
of reviews (high, ≥ 20 or low, ≤ 2). From each type we
chose 5 apartments, resulting in a total sample of n = 20
apartments.
Survey study on MTurk platform. In order to obtain
real-world distributions of the users’ private costs, we col-
lected data from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk marketplace.
After several introductory questions about their preferences
and familiarity with travel accommodations, participants
were shown two randomly chosen apartments from the
Airbnb dataset. To choose between the apartment, partici-
pants were given the price, location, picture, number of re-
views and rating of each apartment, as shown in Figure 2.
Participants were first asked to select their preferred choice
between the two apartments. Next, they were asked to spec-
ify their private cost for choosing the other, less preferred
apartment instead. The collected data from the responses
consists of tuples ((i, j), c), where i is the preferred choice,
j is the suggested alternative, and c is the private cost of the
user.
Sample. In total, we received 943 responses, as summa-
rized in Table 1. The sample for the performance analysis of
Low review countHigh review count
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Figure 3: Results of experiments with Airbnb dataset.
the CoOL algorithm consists of 323 responses, in which i
was a frequently reviewed apartment, j an infrequently re-
viewed apartment, and participants were willing to explore
the infrequently reviewed apartment for a discount (i.e. they
did not select NA).
Utility gain. The utility gain u for getting a review for
infrequently reviewed apartments is set to u = 40 in our
experiments, based on referral discounts given by Airbnb in
the past.
Loss function. As introduced in the methodology section,
we require a convex version of the true loss function for our
online learning framework, ideally acting as a surrogate of
the true loss. Additionally, the gradient of the loss function
needs to be calculated from the binary feedback of accep-
tance/rejection of the offers. However, in the analyzed model
with binary feedback, a loss function that satisfies both re-
quirements cannot be constructed. Instead, we consider a
simplified piece-wise linear convex loss function given by
lt(pt) = 1{pt≥ct} · (pt − ct) + 1{pt<ct} · u∆ · (ct − pt),
where u∆ denotes the magnitude of the gradient when a user
rejects the offer. For the experiment, we use a delta value of
20. Due to this transformation, we use the utility gain rather
than the loss as a useful measure of the performance of the
CoOL algorithm.
Structure. Due to the small number of apartments, we
consider a non-contextual setting with d = 1 and use an r-
bounded hemimetric structure to model the relationship of
the tasks, where r is set to 40 to avoid recommending incen-
tives pt > u. Using a setting with d > 1 would allow for
i j Responses Accepted Avg. Discount
High Low 416 77.6% 29.5$
Low Low 228 83.3% 28.1$
High High 219 82.2 % 25.4$
Low High 80 81.3% 25.9$
Table 1: Responses for different apartment types.
real-world applications with additional context.
Main Results
We now present and discuss the results of the user study.
Descriptive statistics. Out of all responses, 758 (80.4%)
respondents were willing to accept an offer for their less pre-
ferred apartment, given a certain discount per night. Out of
these respondents, the average required discount for accept-
ing the alternative apartment was 27.9 USD per night. The
average required discount for switching from a frequently
reviewed apartment to an infrequently reviewed apartment
was 6% higher.
Out of the respondents who could choose between a fre-
quently and an infrequently reviewed apartment, 83.9% re-
spondents chose the frequently reviewed apartment, while
only 16.1% respondents chose the infrequently reviewed
apartment.
In the responses to an open question about the factors re-
spondents considered to decide on the discount, we captured
the frequency at which different factors were mentioned by
defining several keywords for each factor. The number of
times each factor was mentioned is shown in Table 2.
Algorithm performance. We use the cumulative utility
gain to measure the performance of the IOL and the CoOL
algorithm. The utility gains of both algorithms after 323 re-
sponses are shown in Figure 3(c). The utility gain in Fig-
ure 3(b) is almost 50% higher for the CoOL algorithm than
for the IOL algorithm. Figure 3(c) reveals that this gain is
mainly achieved due to a significant speed up in learning
Category Example keywords Mentions
Location neighborhood, distance 477
Reviews rating, star 309
Price expensive, cheap 182
Picture image, photo 169
Table 2: Mentioned categories for deciding on a discount.
over the first 50 problems.
Discussion. The results of the user study confirm several
findings of (Fradkin 2014), who studied the booking behav-
ior on Airbnb. Similar to this study, we find that apartments
with a high number of reviews are significantly more likely
to be selected. We also find that the average required dis-
count per night is higher when the alternative choice is an
infrequently reviewed apartment. This also points toward a
difference in willingness to pay between frequently and in-
frequently reviewed apartments. Similar results have been
found in earlier studies on other marketplaces (Resnick et
al. 2006; Ye, Law, and Gu 2009; Luca 2011).
The user study also confirms that incentives influence
buying behavior and can help increase exploration on on-
line marketplaces (Avery, Resnick, and Zeckhauser 1999;
Robinson, Nightingale, and Mongrain 2012); when respon-
dents chose a frequently reviewed apartment and were
asked to instead choose an infrequently reviewed apartment,
77.6% of respondents were willing to accept a sufficiently
large offer. More than 10% of those respondents were will-
ing to accept a discount of 10 USD per night or less.
The performance of the IOL and CoOL algorithm in Fig-
ures 3(b) and 3(c) suggests that incentives can be learned via
online learning, and that structural information can be used
to significantly speed up the learning. Further, the speed up
in learning directly increases the marketplace’s utility gain
from suggesting alternative items. To reduce the problem
size on a real-world application such as Airbnb, items could
be grouped by features such as location or number of re-
views. Further, problem-specific features, such as the dis-
tance between apartments could be added to increase the ac-
curacy of the prediction.
Related Work
Multi-armed bandit / Bayesian games. A related path of
research are multi-armed bandit and Bayesian games, where
a principal attempts to coordinate agents to maximize its
utility. Research in this area mainly focuses on changing
the behavior of agents in the way information is disclosed,
rather than through provision of payments. (Kremer, Man-
sour, and Perry 2014) provide optimal information disclo-
sure policies for deterministic utilities and only two possible
actions. (Mansour, Slivkins, and Syrgkanis 2015) general-
ize the results for stochastic utilities and a constant number
of actions. Further, (Mansour et al. 2016) consider the in-
teraction of multiple agents, and (Chakraborty et al. 2017)
analyze a multi-armed bandits in the presence of communi-
cation costs. Our problem is different to previous research in
that utilities are not required to be stochastic, and additional
structural information is available to the principal.
Recommender systems. A different approach to encour-
aging exploration in online marketplaces are recommender
systems, which are known to influence buyers’ purchasing
decisions and can be used to encourage exploration (Resnick
and Varian 1997; Senecal and Nantel 2004). For example, -
greedy recommender systems recommend a product closest
to the buyer’s preferences with probability (1− ) and a ran-
dom product with probability  (Ten Hagen, Van Someren,
and Hollink 2003). Such recommender systems can be ex-
tended using ideas studied in this paper.
Online/distributed multi-task learning. Multi-task
learning has been increasingly studied in online and dis-
tributed settings recently. Inspired by wearable computing,
a recent work by (Jin et al. 2015) studied online multi-task
learning in a distributed setting. They considered a setup,
where tasks arrive asynchronously, and the relatedness
among the tasks is maintained via a correlation matrix.
However, there is no theoretical analysis on the regret
bounds for the proposed algorithms. (Wang, Kolar, and
Srerbo 2016) recently studied the multi-task learning for
distributed LASSO with shared support. Their work is dif-
ferent from ours — we consider general convex constraints
to model task relationships and consider the adversarial
online regret minimization framework.
Conclusions and Future Work
We highlighted the need in the sharing economy to actively
shape demand by incentivizing users to differ from their pre-
ferred choices and explore different options instead. To learn
the incentives users require to choose different items, we
developed a novel algorithm, CoOL, which uses structural
information in user preferences to speed up learning. The
key idea of our algorithm is to exploit structural information
in a computationally efficient way by performing sporadic
and approximate projections. We formally derived no-regret
bounds for the CoOL algorithm and provided evidence for
the increase in performance over the IOL baseline through
several experiments. In a user study with apartments from
the rental marketplace Airbnb, we demonstrated the practi-
cal applicability of our approach in a real-world setting. To
conclude, we discuss several additional considerations for
offering incentives in a sharing economy platform.
Safety/individual consumer loss. Generally, exploration
in the sharing economy may be risky, and individuals can
face severe losses while exploring. For example, new hosts
might not be trustworthy, and new drivers in ridesharing sys-
tems might not be reliable. In our approach, the items to be
explored are controlled by the platform, and appropriate pre-
conditions would need to be implemented to minimize risks.
Reliability/Consistency. In order for platforms to imple-
ment an algorithmic provision of monetary incentives, it is
important that incentives are reliable and consistent over
time. Ideally, similar users should receive similar incentives,
and offers should be consistent with the user’s preferences.
Using the CoOL algorithm, consistency can be controlled
through appropriate convex constraints.
Strategy-proofness. Providing monetary incentives
based on user preferences creates possibilities for oppor-
tunistic behavior. For example, users could attempt to
repeatedly decline offers to receive higher offers in the
future or browse certain items hoping to receive offers for
similar items. To control for such behavior, markets need
to be large enough so that behavior of individuals does not
affect overall learning. Further, platforms can control the
number and frequency with which individual users receive
offers to minimize opportunistic possibilities.
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Outine of the Supplement
We start the supplement by introducing properties of the Bregman divergence and additional notation required for the proofs
of the regret bounds. We further introduce two basic propositions and several lemmas. We then provide formal justification
for using weighted projection in the CoOL algorithm, cf. Equation (4). Lastly, we provide the proof of the regret bound of the
CoOL algorithm in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.
Preleminaries
Bregman Divergence
For any strictly convex function Rt : Rd → R, the Bregman divergence DRt between a, b ∈ Rd is defined as the difference
between the value of Rt at a, and the first-order Taylor expansion of Rt around b evaluated at a, i.e.
DRt(a,b) = R
t(a)−Rt(b)−∇Rt(b) · (a − b),
We use the following properties of the Bregman divergence, cf. (Rakhlin and Tewari 2009):
• The Bregman divergences is non-negative.
• The Bregman projection
b̂ = argmin
a∈S
DRt(a,b)
onto a convex set S exists and is unique.
• For b̂ defined as in the Bregman projection above and u ∈ S, by the generalized Pythagorean theorem, cf. (Cesa-Bianchi and
Lugosi 2006), the Bregman divergence satisfies
DRt(u,b) ≥ DRt(u, b̂) +DRt (̂b, b).
• The three-point equality
DRt(a,b) +DRt(b, c) = DRt(a,c) + (a − b)(∇R(c)−∇R(b))
follows directly from the definition of the Bregman divergence.
Notation
Throughout the supplement we use ηtz =
η√
τtz
and Qt as per Equation (3). Similar to the definition of wt, we also define xt,
and gt as the concatenation of the task specific feature and gradient vectors, i.e.
xt =
[
(xt1)
′ · · ·(xtz)′ · · ·(xtK)′
]′
gt =
[
(gt1)
′ · · ·(gtz)′ · · ·(gtK)′
]′
.
where for all t,xt and gt are 0 in all positions that do not correspond to task zt. We also use w˜t+1 to refer to the concatenation
of the updated task specific weights, before any coordination, such that
w˜
t+1
=
[
(w1)
′ · · ·(wz)′ · · ·(wK)′
]′
.
wherewz = wtz for z 6= zt andwz = w˜tz otherwise.
Propositions
In the following we introduce two basic propositions that we need for the proof of Theorem 1.
Proposition 1. If τz ∈ R+ for all z ∈ {1 . . .K}, and
K∑
z=1
τz = T, then
K∑
z=1
√
τz ≤
√
TK.
Proof. Extending and applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we get
K∑
z=1
√
τz ≤
√√√√ K∑
z=1
1
√√√√ K∑
z=1
τz
=
√
K
√
T
=
√
TK
Proposition 2. The sum from
∑T
t=1
1√
t
is bounded by 2
√
T − 1.
Proof.
T∑
t=1
1√
t
≤ 1 +
∫ T
t=1
1√
t
dt
= 1 +
[
2
√
t
]T
1
= 2
√
T − 1
Lemmas
In this section we introduce the lemmas required for the proof of the regret bounds of the CoOL algorithm. Applying Lemma 1
allows us to replace the loss function with its linearization, similar to (Zinkevich 2003). Lemmas 2 and 3 allow us to get an
equivalent update procedure, using the Bregman divergence, and Lemma 4 gives a handle on the linearized regret bound, cf.
(Rakhlin and Tewari 2009). Lemma 5 uses the duality gap to upper bound the Bregman divergence between the exact and
approximate projection. Lemmas 6 and 7 provide different upper bounds on the Bregman divergence.
Lemma 1. For all t andwtz there exists a gtz ∈ Rd such that lt(wtz) can be replaced with gt ·wtz without loss of generality.
Proof. The loss function affects the regret in two ways: First, the loss function’s gradient is used in the update step, and second,
the loss function is used to calculate the regret of the algorithm. Let gtz = ∇lt(wtz) and consider the linearized loss gtz · wtz .
Using the linearized loss, the behavior of the algorithm remains unchanged, since ∇lt(wtz) = gtz . Further, the regret either
increases or remains unchanged, since the loss function is convex, such that for all uz ∈ Sz
lt(uz) ≥ gtz · (uz −wtz) + lt(wtz).
Rearranging, we get
lt(wtz)− lt(uz) ≤ gtz ·wtz − gtz · uz,
such that using a linearized loss, the regret either remains constant or increases.
Lemma 2. For Rt(w) = 12w
′Qtw, the update rule
w˜
t+1
= wt − ηtzgt
is equivalent to the update rule
w˜
t+1
= argmin
w∈RdK
ηgt ·w +DRt(w,wt).
Proof. For the second update rule, inserting Rt(w) = 12w
′Qtw into the definition of the Bregman divergence and setting the
derivative with respect tow evaluated at w˜t+1 to zero, we have
ηgt + w˜
t+1
Qt −wtQt = 0
Rewriting, using that gt is non-zero only in entries that correspond to zt, and applying the definitions ofQt and η, we get
w˜
t+1
= wt − ηgt(Qt)−1
= wt − η√
τ tz
gt
= wt − ηtzgt.
Lemma 3. For Rt(w) = 12w
′Qtw, the update rule
wt+1 = argmin
w∈S∗
DRt(w,w˜
t+1
),
where w˜t+1 = wt − ηtzgt, is equivalent to the update rule
wt+1 = argmin
w∈S∗
ηgt ·w +DRt(w,wt)
Proof. Applying the definition of Rt(w), we can rewrite
wt+1 = argmin
w∈S∗
DRt(w,w˜
t+1
)
= argmin
w∈S∗
1
2
(w −wt + ηgt(Qt)−1)′Qt(w −wt + ηgt(Qt)−1)
= argmin
w∈S∗
ηgt ·w + 1
2
(w −wt)′Qt(w −wt)
= argmin
w∈S∗
ηgt ·w +DRt(w,wt)
Lemma 4. If wt+1 is the constraint minimizer of the objective ηgt ·w +DRt(w,wt) as stated in Lemma 3, then for any a in
the solution space,
ηgt · (wt+1 − a) ≤ DRt(a,wt)−DRt(a,wt+1)−DRt(wt+1,wt).
Proof. Sincewt+1 is the constraint minimizer of the objective ηgt ·w +DRt(w,wt), any vector pointing away fromwt+1 into
the solution space has a positive product with the gradient of the objective atwt+1, such that
0 ≤ (a −wt+1) · (ηgt +∇Rt(wt+1)−∇Rt(wt)).
Rewriting and using the three-point equality, we get
ηgt · (wt+1 − a) ≤ (a −wt+1) · (∇Rt(wt+1)−∇Rt(wt))
= DRt(a,w
t)−DRt(a,wt+1)−DRt(wt+1,wt).
Lemma 5. If ŵt+1 is the exact solution of
argmin
w∈S∗
DRt(w,w˜
t+1
)
andwt+1 ∈ S∗ is an approximate solution with duality gap less than δt, then
δt ≥ DRt(ŵt+1,wt+1).
Proof. The duality gap is defined as the difference between the primal and dual value of the solution. The dual value
is upper bounded by the optimal solution and thus less than or equal to DRt(ŵ
t+1
, w˜
t+1
). Thus, for the primal solution
DRt(w
t+1, w˜
t+1
) with duality gap less than δt, we have
δt ≥ DRt(wt+1, w˜t+1)−DRt(ŵt+1, w˜t+1)
Note that ŵt+1 is the projection of w˜t+1 onto S∗ andwt+1 ∈ S∗. Thus, using the propertiesof the Bregman divergence we can
apply the generalized Pythagorean theorem such that
DRt(w
t+1, w˜
t+1
) ≥ DRt(wt+1, ŵt+1) +DRt(ŵt+1, w˜t+1)
Inserting into the above inequality we get the result.
Lemma 6. For Rt(w) = 12w
′Qtw and a and b ∈ S,
DRt(a,b) ≤ 1
2
‖Smax‖2
√
tK
Proof. Using the definition ofQt, noting that ‖az − bz‖2 ≤ ‖Smax‖2, and applying Proposition 1 we can write
DRt(a,b) =
1
2
(a − b)′Qt(a − b)
=
1
2
K∑
z=1
‖az − bz‖2
√
τ tz
≤ 1
2
‖Smax‖2
K∑
z=1
√
τ tz
≤ 1
2
‖Smax‖2
√
tK
Lemma 7. For any two at, bt ∈ S,
T∑
t=1
DRt+1(a
t, bt)−DRt(at, bt) ≤ 1
2
‖Smax‖2
√
TK.
Proof. Applying our definition of Rt, we can rewrite
T∑
t=1
DRt+1(a
t, bt)−DRt(at, bt) = 1
2
T∑
t=1
(at − bt)′(Qt+1 −Qt)(at − bt).
Note that
(Qt+1 −Qt) =

√
τ t+11 −
√
τ t1 0
. . .
0
√
τ t+1K −
√
τ tK
 .
Applying Proposition 1 and using ‖az − bz‖2 ≤ ‖Sz‖2 ≤ ‖Smax‖2 we get
T∑
t=1
DRt+1
∥∥at, bt∥∥−DRt(at, bt) = 1
2
T∑
t=1
K∑
z=1
(√
τ t+1z −
√
τ tz
)∥∥atz − btz∥∥2
≤ 1
2
‖Smax‖2
K∑
z=1
T∑
t=1
(√
τ t+1z −
√
τ tz
)
=
1
2
‖Smax‖2
K∑
z=1
(√
τT+1z −
√
τ1z
)
=
1
2
‖Smax‖2
(
K∑
z=1
(√
τT+1z
)
− 1
)
=
1
2
‖Smax‖2
(
K∑
z=1
(√
τTz
)
+
√
τT+1
zT+1
−
√
τT
zT+1
− 1
)
=
1
2
‖Smax‖2
(
K∑
z=1
(√
τTz
)
+
√
τT
zT+1
+ 1−
√
τT
zT+1
− 1
)
≤ 1
2
‖Smax‖2
K∑
z=1
√
τTz
≤ 1
2
‖Smax‖2
√
TK
Idea of Weighted Projections
The update in Algorithm 2 line 7 can be equivalently written as
w˜
t+1
= wt − ηtzgt.
As shown in Lemma 2, we can rewrite this as
w˜
t+1
= argmin
w∈RdK
ηgt ·w +DRt(w,wt),
using the regularizer Rt(w) = 12w ·Qtw.
Intuitively, the CoOL algorithm restricts the solution to S∗, such that the update can be rewritten as
wt+1 = argmin
w∈S∗
ηgt ·w +DRt(w,wt)
= argmin
w∈S∗
ηgt ·w + 1
2
(w −wt) ·Qt(w −wt)
= argmin
w∈S∗
1
2
(w −wt + ηgt(Qt)−1) ·Qt(w −wt + ηgt(Qt)−1)
= argmin
w∈S∗
1
2
(w − w˜t+1) ·Qt(w − w˜t+1),
which is equal to the weighted projection introduced in Equation (4). Using weights defined by some other heuristics could
in general lead to a higher regret. For instance, in Figure 1(c) we show the increase in regret of the CoOL algorithm, when
settingQt as the identity matrix.
Proof of Theorem 1
In the following we provide the proof of Theorem 1, using notation and results of the earlier sections of the supplement.
Unlike earlier work (e.g. (Zinkevich 2003; Rakhlin and Tewari 2009)), in our setting projections are allowed to be noisy and
therefore, the solution may not be a constraint minimizer of the projection. Additionally, in our setting projection may occur
only sporadically, and thus intermediary solutions may not be in S∗. To keep track of whether projection occurred, we define
indicator functions and handle the special case of projection at time t without projection at time t− 1 separately.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 1
Preparation
We define ŵt as the exact solution of the projection onto S∗, such that
ŵ
t
= argmin
w∈S∗
(w − w˜t+1)′Qt(w − w˜t+1).
Recall that ξt is 1 with probability α and 0 with probability (1− α). The algorithm projects onto S∗ if ξt = 1 and onto Sz if
ξt = 0. We define the indicator functions
1{ξt} =
{
1 if ξt = 1
0 otherwise.
and the inverse
1{¬ξt} =
{
1 if ξt = 0
0 otherwise.
as well as
1{(¬ξt−1)∧(ξt)} =
{
1 if ξt−1 = 0 and ξt = 1
0 otherwise.
and the inverse
1{(ξt−1)∨(¬ξt)} =
{
1 if ξt−1 = 1 or ξt = 0
0 otherwise.
Our goal is to upper bound the regret, which, using Lemma 1, we can write as
RegretCoOL(T ) =
T∑
t=1
gtzt · (wtzt − uzt).
Using the definitions above, we rewrite
T∑
t=1
gtzt · (wtzt − uzt) =
T∑
t=1
gt · (wt − u)
=
T∑
t=1
gt · (ŵt+1 − u) +
T∑
t=1
gt · (wt − ŵt+1)
=
T∑
t=1
1{ξt}gt · (ŵt+1 − u) +
T∑
t=1
1{¬ξt}gt · (ŵt+1 − u)
+T∑
t=1
1{(ξt−1)∨(¬ξt)}gt · (wt − ŵt+1) +
T∑
t=1
1{(¬ξt−1)∧(ξt)}gt · (wt − ŵt+1).
and further upper bound each sum individually.
Throughout the proof, we use the Bregman divergence with the regularizer Rt(w) = 12w
′Qtw, and apply Lemmas 2 and 3
to get an equivalent update procedure.
Step 1: First sum
Applying Lemma 4 with ŵt+1 as the constraint minimizer of the objective ηgt ·w +DRt(w,wt) and u ∈ S∗, we have
ηgt · (ŵt+1 − u) ≤ DRt(u,wt)−DRt(u, ŵt+1)−DRt(ŵt+1,wt).
Summing over time,
η
T∑
t=1
1{ξt}gt · (ŵt+1 − u) ≤
T∑
t=1
1{ξt}
(
DRt(u,w
t)−DRt(u, ŵt+1)−DRt(ŵt+1,wt)
)
=
T∑
t=1
(
1{ξt+1}DRt+1(u,wt+1)− 1{ξt}DRt(u, ŵt+1)− 1{ξt}DRt(ŵt+1,wt)
)
+ 1{ξ1}DR1(u,w1)− 1{ξT+1}DRT+1(u,wT+1)
≤
T∑
t=1
(
1{ξt+1}DRt+1(u,wt+1)− 1{ξt}DRt(u,wt+1)
)
+
T∑
t=1
1{ξt}
(
DRt(u,w
t+1)−DRt(u, ŵt+1)
)
+ 1{ξ1}DR1(u,w1).
In the following, we upper bound each term individually. For now we leave the first term unchanged and provide an upper
bound in step 3 by combining it with the results of step 2.
For the second term, we use that for our choice of R, the square root of the Bregman divergence is a norm and therefore
satisfies the triangle inequality. Thus,√
DRt(u,wt+1) ≤
√
DRt(u, ŵ
t+1
) +
√
DRt(ŵ
t+1
,wt+1).
Squaring both sides, we have
DRt(u,w
t+1) ≤ DRt(u, ŵt+1) +DRt(ŵt+1,wt+1) + 2
√
DRt(ŵ
t+1
,wt+1)DRt(u, ŵ
t+1
).
Applying Lemmas 5 and 6, we get
DRt(u,w
t+1)−DRt(u, ŵt+1) ≤ δt +
√
2δt(tK)1/4 ‖Smax‖ .
For the third term, using thatQ1 is 1 in exactly one position, we have
1{ξ1}DR1(u,w1) ≤ 1{ξ1} 1
2
‖Smax‖2 .
Combining and dividing by η, we get the upper bound for the first sum
T∑
t=1
1{ξt}gt · (ŵt+1 − u) ≤ 1
η
T∑
t=1
1{ξt+1}DRt+1(u,wt+1)− 1{ξt}DRt(u,wt+1)
+
1
η
T∑
t=1
1{ξt}
(
δt +
√
2δt(tK)1/4 ‖Smax‖
)
+
1
2η
1{ξ1} ‖Smax‖2 .
Step 2: Second sum
Similar to step 1, we get
η
T∑
t=1
1{¬ξt}gt · (ŵt+1 − u) ≤
T∑
t=1
(
1{¬ξt+1}DRt+1(u,wt+1)− 1{¬ξt}DRt(u,wt+1)
)
+
T∑
t=1
1{¬ξt}
(
DRt(u,w
t+1)−DRt(u, ŵt+1)
)
+ 1{¬ξ1}DR1(u,w1).
As in step 1, we leave the first term unchanged. For the second term, note that wt+1 is not project onto S∗, and thus ŵt = wt
for all t, such that
T∑
t=1
1{¬ξt}
(
DRt(u,w
t+1)−DRt(u, ŵt+1)
)
= 0.
For the third term, similar to step 1, we have
1{¬ξ1}DR1(u,w1) ≤ 1{¬ξ1} 1
2
‖Smax‖2 .
Combining, we get the upper bound for the second sum
T∑
t=1
1{¬ξt}gt · (ŵt+1 − u) ≤ 1
η
T∑
t=1
1{¬ξt+1}DRt+1(u,wt+1)− 1{¬ξt}DRt(u,wt+1)
+
1
2η
1{¬ξ1} ‖Smax‖2 .
Step 3: Combination of steps 1 and 2
Note that 1{ξt} + 1{¬ξt} = 1 for all t. Thus, the first terms of step 1 and 2 sum to
1
η
T∑
t=1
DRt+1(u,w
t+1)−DRt(u,wt+1).
Using Lemma 7, we get
1
η
T∑
t=1
DRt+1(u,w
t+1)−DRt(u,wt+1) ≤ 1
2η
‖Smax‖2
√
TK.
Summing the remaining terms and again noting that 1{ξt}+1{¬ξt} = 1, we get the upper bound for the first and second sum
T∑
t=1
gt · (ŵt+1 − u) ≤ 1
2η
‖Smax‖2
√
TK +
1
2η
‖Smax‖2
+
1
η
T∑
t=1
1{ξt}
(
δt +
√
2δt(tK)1/4 ‖Smax‖
)
.
Step 4: Third sum
To upper bound
∑T
t=1 1{(ξt−1)∨(¬ξt)}g
t · (wt− ŵt+1) we start by using Ho¨lder’s inequality (see for example (Beckenbach and
Bellman 2012)) to get
gt · (wt −wthat+1) ≤ ∥∥gt∥∥∗
Qt
∥∥∥wt − ŵt+1∥∥∥
Qt
,
where ∥∥gt∥∥∗
Qt
= max
x
x · gt : ‖x‖Qt ≤ 1.
For the norm
∥∥∥wt − ŵt+1∥∥∥
Qt
we applya Lemma 4 with ŵt+1 as the constraint minimizer of the objective ηgt · w +
DRt(w,w
t) withwt ∈ S∗. Using the symmetry of the Bregman divergence for our choice of Rt,
ηgt · (ŵt+1 −wt) ≤ −2DRt(wt+1,wt)
and thus
DRt(ŵ
t+1
,wt) ≤ 1
2
ηgt · (wt − ŵt+1).
Note that DRt(wt, ŵ
t+1
) = 12
∥∥∥wt − ŵt+1∥∥∥2
Qt
and thus,∥∥∥wt − ŵt+1∥∥∥2
Qt
≤ ηgt · (wt − ŵt+1).
Using Ho¨lder’s inequality on the right side of the inequality, we get∥∥wt −wt+1∥∥
Qt
≤ η ∥∥gt∥∥∗
Qt
.
Therefore,
gt · (wt −wt+1) ≤ η(∥∥gt∥∥∗
Qt
)2
We now apply the definition of the dual norm to rewrite ‖gt‖∗Qt . Note that gt is non-zero only in position zt and thus∥∥gt∥∥∗
Qt
= max
x
x · gt : ‖x‖Qt ≤ 1
= max
xzt
xztg
t
zt :
(
‖xzt‖22
√
τ tzt
)1/2
≤ 1
= max
xzt
xzg
t
zt : ‖xzt‖2 ≤
1√
τ tzt
1/2
≤ max
xzt
‖xzt‖2
∥∥gtzt∥∥2 : ‖xzt‖2 ≤ 1√
τ tzt
1/2
The maximum is achieved at ‖xzt‖2 = 1√τt
zt
1/2 . Thus,∥∥gt∥∥∗
Qt
≤ ∥∥gtzt∥∥2 1√
τ tzt
1/2
.
Inserting, summing, and using Propositions 1 and 2, we get the upper bound for the third sum,
T∑
t=1
1{(ξt−1)∨(¬ξt)}gt · (wt −wt+1) ≤ η
T∑
t=1
K∑
z=1
∥∥gtz∥∥22 1√τ tz
≤ η
K∑
z=1
T∑
t=1
‖gz‖2 1√
τ tz
≤ 2η
K∑
z=1
‖gz‖2
(√
τTz − 1
)
≤ 2η ‖gmax‖2
K∑
z=1
(√
τTz − 1
)
≤ 2η ‖gmax‖2
√
TK − 2η ‖gmax‖2K
Step 5: Fourth sum
For the fourth sum we use that
gt · (wt − ŵt+1) = gtzt · (wtzt − ŵt+1zt ).
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we get
gtzt · (wtzt − ŵt+1zt ) ≤
∥∥gtzt∥∥2 ∥∥∥wtzt − ŵt+1zt ∥∥∥2
≤ ‖Smax‖ ‖gmax‖
Thus,
T∑
t=1
1{(¬ξt−1)∧(ξt)}gt · (wt − ŵt+1) ≤
T∑
t=1
1{(¬ξt−1)∧(ξt)} ‖Smax‖ ‖gmax‖ .
Step 6: Combination
Adding the results from steps 1 to 5, we get the result
T∑
t=1
gt · (wt − u) ≤ 1
2η
‖Smax‖2
√
TK + 2η ‖gmax‖2
√
TK
+
T∑
t=1
1{(¬ξt−1)∧(ξt)} ‖Smax‖ ‖gmax‖
+
1
η
T∑
t=1
1{ξt}
(
δt +
√
2δt(tK)1/4 ‖Smax‖
)
+
1
2η
‖Smax‖2 − 2η ‖gmax‖2K.
Proof of Corollary 1
By plugging in specific algorithmic parameters into Theorem 1 we can get more concrete regret bounds on the CoOL algorithm.
We provide no-regret bounds for the parametric choices of sporadic and approximate projection, and note that similar no-regret
bounds can also be achieved for different parameters.
Proof of Corollary 1. Inserting η = 12
‖Smax‖
‖gmax‖ into the results of Theorem 1, taking the expected value over ξ
t, and using that
K ≥ 1, we get
E
[
T∑
t=1
gt · (wt − u)
]
≤ 2
√
TK ‖Smax‖ ‖gmax‖
+ α(1− α)T ‖Smax‖ ‖gmax‖
+ 2α
‖gmax‖
‖Smax‖
T∑
t=1
(
δt +
√
2δt(tK)1/4 ‖Smax‖
)
.
For the third term, sing δt = cβ(1− β)2
√
K√
t
‖Smax‖2 where cβ ≥ 0, β ∈ [0, 1], then
δt +
√
2δt(tK)1/4 ‖Smax‖ = cβ(1− β)2
√
K√
t
‖Smax‖2 + (1− β)
√
2cβ
√
K ‖Smax‖2
≤ cβ(1− β)
√
K ‖Smax‖2 + (1− β)
√
2cβ
√
K ‖Smax‖2
= (1− β)
√
K(cβ +
√
2cβ) ‖Smax‖2 ,
and, using Proposition 2 for the sum,
T∑
t=1
δt +
√
2δt(tK)1/4 ‖Smax‖ ≤ α(1− β)T
√
K(cβ +
√
2cβ) ‖Smax‖2 .
Inserting α = cα√
T
where cα ∈ [0,
√
T ], we get
E
[
T∑
t=1
gt · (wt − u)
]
≤ 2
√
TK ‖Smax‖ ‖gmax‖
+
√
Tcα
(
1− cα√
T
)
‖Smax‖ ‖gmax‖
+ 2
√
TKcα(cβ +
√
2cβ)(1− β) ‖Smax‖ ‖gmax‖ .
